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Non-technical Summary 
The main reason governments grant patent protection is to spur innovation.  Patents 
give inventors temporary monopoly rights that allow them to appropriate a greater 
share of the returns from their innovations and this augments private incentives to 
undertake research and development (R&D) investment. Consequently, patent 
protection should stimulate private R&D investment.   
Drawing on real options investment theory, this paper highlights one mechanism 
through which patents may improve appropriability and stimulate R&D investment – 
by reducing the effect of market uncertainty on the firm’s investment decision.  The 
real options framework predicts that greater uncertainty about market revenues 
reduces investment in irreversible capital by increasing the value of waiting.   
A patent may protect the firm from market competition due to, among other things, 
imitation by rivals.  This reduces the patenting firm’s sensitivity to market 
uncertainty, decreases the value of waiting, and leads to greater current R&D 
investment.  If patent protection mitigates market uncertainty, R&D investment by 
patenting firms should be less responsive to revenue volatility than non-patenting 
firms.   
Our regression analysis tests this hypothesis. We find that R&D investment by non-
patenting firms falls in response to market uncertainty measured by revenue volatility 
while firms with patent protection have no significant response.  To date, this 
mechanism has not been examined in the literature but it may prove to be a fruitful 
approach to estimating the R&D incentive effects of patent protection, an indirect 
measure of the value of patenting.  
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1 Introduction 
The main reason governments grant patent protection is to spur innovation.  Patents give 
inventors temporary monopoly rights that allow them to appropriate a greater share of the 
returns from their innovations and this augments private incentives to undertake research and 
development (R&D) investment.2  Consequently, patent protection should stimulate private 
R&D investment.  However, the size of the R&D stimulus from patent protection is far from 
clear since it depends on how effective patents are as a mechanism for appropriating returns.3 
Drawing on real options investment theory, this paper highlights one mechanism through 
which patents may improve appropriability and stimulate R&D investment – by reducing the 
effect of market uncertainty on the firm’s investment decision.  The real options framework 
predicts that greater uncertainty about market revenues reduces investment in irreversible 
capital by increasing the value of waiting (Pindyck 1991; Dixit 1992; Dixit and Pindyck 
1994).  R&D investment is highlighted in this literature as a particularly relevant example of 
irreversible capital since a large proportion of R&D supports the salaries of research 
personnel and cannot be recouped if projects fail.  Firms can avoid large losses by waiting for 
new information about market conditions and forgoing investment when this information is 
unfavorable.   This would lower current R&D investment. Alternatively, a patent may protect 
the firm from market competition due to, among other things, imitation by rivals.  This 
                                                 
2 Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998) discuss the various economic theories for patent protection and review some of 
the early empirical literature. 
3 This observation is the starting point for a large theoretical and empirical literature that cannot be summarized 
in this paper.  The empirical literature uses either survey data or patent renewal data to shed light on differences 
in patent effectiveness or patent value.  Also, since patenting involves the disclosure of information, the firm’s 
decision to patent represents a tradeoff between monopoly rents and disclosure.  Thus, patents do not 
unambiguously induce R&D investment.  Arora et al. (2003) discuss this issue and Cohen (2005) surveys the 
arguments and evidence on appropriation. 
2 
reduces the patenting firm’s sensitivity to market uncertainty, decreases the value of waiting, 
and leads to greater current R&D investment.   
If patent protection mitigates market uncertainty, R&D investment by patenting firms should 
be less responsive to revenue volatility than non-patenting firms.  Our regression analysis 
tests this hypothesis using an interaction term between revenue volatility and a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm patents or not.  We find that R&D investment by non-
patenting firms falls in response to revenue volatility while firms with patent protection have 
no significant response.  To date, this mechanism has not been examined in the literature but 
it may prove to be a fruitful approach to estimating the R&D incentive effects of patent 
protection, an indirect measure of the value of patenting.      
2 Data 
Our sample is a pooled cross-section of 692 “innovative” manufacturing firms for 1998 and 
2000 taken from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) survey.  An innovative firm is 
defined to be a company that introduced at least one new product into a market during the 
previous six years, 1992-1997 and 1995-1999, respectively.  In addition to the survey data, 
we collected information on the patenting activity from the German Patent and Trademark 
Office.  
The dependent variable is R&D expenditure at the firm level (RDi) in millions of DM (1.9583 
DM = 1 EUR).  Although we consider only previous product innovators, we find that about 
29% of the firms in the sample did not conduct R&D in 1998 or 2000.  Our econometric 
analysis takes this into account by modeling the censored distribution of R&D.  Above zero, 
the distribution of R&D spending is quite skewed and this motivates our logarithmic 
specification (lnR&Di).  Since we cannot take the log of the censored observations at R&Di = 
3 
0, we set those observations to the minimum observed positive R&D value in the sample and 
interpret this observed minimum as the censoring point in the regression models.  
The covariate of central interest is market uncertainty (UNCER).  We assume firms use their 
prior market experience as innovators to form their expectations about future market 
uncertainty.  Market uncertainty is measured as the variance in the share of sales achieved 
with new products per year in the pre-sample period.  The number of observations available 
for each firm varies from three to six years: 
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where sales*it denotes the share of sales achieved with new products in firm i in year t. This 
variable captures the volatility of revenue from new market introductions.   
Our analysis includes several firm level and aggregate level control variables.  For each firm i 
the variables are:  (1) DPATt, a dummy variable identifying firms with patent protection in 
the pre-sample period; (2) PSTOCKt-1, the stock of firm patents to control for a firm’s patent 
propensity; (3) EMPt, the number of employees to control for firm size; (4) CRt-1, credit 
rating index to control for the firm’s access to credit markets (lower scores indicate better 
credit); (5) GROUPt, a dummy varible to control for whether the firm is associated with a 
group of companies since these firms may have better access to capital; (6) FOREIGNt, a 
dummy variable to control for subsidiaries of foreign companies.  The aggregate level control 
variables include industry effects using eleven dummies variables; HHIt-1, the industry’s 
Herfindahl index based on shares of market sales to control for the degree of competition; 
and a time dummy to control for other macroeconomic effects. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics of all variables used (for convenience the index i indicating firm level variables is 
omitted).  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (692 observations) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R&Dt (in million DM) 15.483 117.155 0 1990
UNCERt (uncertainty measure) 0.054 0.072 0 0.500
PSTOCKt-1 (Patent stock) 0.014 0.056 0 0.877
EMPt (number of employees) 899.270 3781.251 5 43118
HHIt-1 (industry concentration) 45.779 66.090 3.441 427.702
CRt-1 (credit rating index) 197.554 61.033 100 600
D2000t (year dummy) 0.530 0.499 0 1
GROUPt (group dummy) 0.451 0.498 0 1
FOREIGNt (foreign parent company) 0.126 0.332 0 1
Note: 11 industry dummies not presented.  
3 Empirical Results 
Table 2 presents our regression results. We consider two versions of equation to be estimated: 
model A excludes the interaction between market uncertainty and patent protection in order 
to test the idea that market uncertainty reduces R&D investment; model B includes the 
interaction to test our main hypothesis.  We estimate both homoscedastic Tobit and 
heteroscedastic Tobit models. Likelihood ratio tests show that homoscedasticity is rejected. 
As predicted by real options theory, model A shows that market uncertainty significantly 
reduces firm-level R&D investment.  This finding is consistent with prior work by Czarnitzki 
and Toole (2006) who find that market uncertainty reduces firm-level R&D investment using 
a different sample and specification.4  It is also consistent with a larger body of empirical 
findings on how uncertainty effects physical capital investment.5   
Model B allows the effect market uncertainty to differ across patenting and non-patenting 
firms and shows that R&D investment by patenting firms is less sensitive to revenue 
volatility than non-patenting firms.  For non-patenting firms, market uncertainty significantly 
                                                 
4 Using a sample of nine OECD countries, Goel and Ram (2001) find that “inflation uncertainty” reduces R&D 
outlays. 
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reduces R&D investment whereas for patenting firms the effect of market uncertainty is 
insignificant.6,7  Using the model, an increase in uncertainty by one standard deviation leads 
non-patenting firms to reduce R&D investment by 43%, a sizable impact.      
Schankerman (1998) suggests calculating the “equivalent subsidy to R&D” (ESR) as measure 
of the private value of patent rights.  ESR answers the question: “If patent protection were 
eliminated, what cash subsidy would have to be paid to firms performing R&D to yield the 
same level of R&D?” (Schankerman 1998, p. 95).  Using the estimates from model B, we 
conduct a slightly different counter-factual exercise:  if a non-patenting firm responded to 
uncertainty like a firm with patent protection, what is the implied increase in R&D 
investment?  This exercise suggests that patent protection confers a 20% increase in R&D 
investment.  While simple, our 20% ESR estimate for German firms is consistent with the 
literature and falls between the Schankerman (1998) ESR estimate of 24.4% using French 
data and the Arora et al. (2003) ESR estimate of 17% using U.S. data.8   
The control variables in the analysis have the expected signs although most are insignificant.  
Our results indicate that firm with a higher propensity invest more is R&D.  Firm size is also 
significant and indicates that larger firms invest more in R&D.  
                                                                                                                                                        
5 See Carruth et al. (2000) for a survey of these studies and Bulan (2004) for a recent contribution. 
6 Using OECD data, Kanwar and Evanson (2003) find that intellectual property rights significantly increase 
R&D investment as a share of gross national product.      
7 We tested for industry differences in the slope response to uncertainty.  Using a Chi-squared test, we could not 
reject the null hypothesis of equality across the industry coefficients.    
8 Using patent renewal data, Lanjouw (1998) shows simulation results for four West German technology groups.  
Her ESR estimates range from 11.5% for engines to 75.4% for textiles. 
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Table 2: Tobit regressions on ln(R&D) at the firm level 
Variable Model A Model B 
 homo- 
scedastic 
hetero- 
scedastica) 
homo- 
scedastic 
hetero- 
scedastic a) 
ln(EMP) 1.245 *** 1.392 *** 1.231 *** 1.378 *** 
 (0.093)  (0.088)  (0.094)  (0.089)  
UNCER -7.953 *** -8.300 ***    
 (1.884)  (2.021)     
UNCER*DPAT   -4.786  -4.291  
   (3.402)  (3.459)  
UNCER*(1-DPAT)   -8.919 *** -9.798 *** 
   (2.087)  (2.291)  
PSTOCK/EMP 4.537 ** 4.637 ** 4.156 ** 4.141 ** 
 (2.060)  (1.878)  (2.086)  (1.908)  
ln(HHI) 0.150  0.170  0.141  0.172  
 (0.151)  (0.145)  (0.151)  (0.145)  
ln(CR) -0.070  0.056  -0.104  -0.001  
 (0.535)  (0.494)  (0.535)  (0.494)  
D2000 -1.520 *** -1.353 *** -1.436 *** -1.238 *** 
 (0.243)  (0.229)  (0.254)  (0.243)  
GROUP 0.443  0.278  0.432  0.266  
 (0.280)  (0.266)  (0.280)  (0.265)  
FOREIGN -0.307  -0.008  -0.303  -0.000  
 (0.380)  (0.342)  (0.379)  (0.342)  
Intercept -11.374 *** -16.213 *** -11.112 *** -15.888 *** 
 (3.169)  (4.047)  (3.176)  (4.044)  
Test on joint significance of 10 
industry dummies (c2(10)) 103.47*** 105.27*** 103.17*** 104.82*** 
# of observations 692 692 692 692 
Log-likelihood -1349.69 -1315.56 -1349.074 -1314.56 
McFadden R2 0.145 0.167 0.145 0.167 
LR-test on heteroscedasticity 
(c2(15))  68.26***  64.58*** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).  
a) Heteroscedasticity term includes 10 industry dummies and 5 size dummies (based on the number of 
employees) 
4 Conclusions 
Drawing on the real options investment theory, this paper highlights one mechanism through 
which patent protection may improve appropriability and stimulate R&D investment:  patent 
protection reduces the firm’s sensitivity to market uncertainty, decreases the value of waiting, 
and leads to greater current R&D investment.  Our estimates suggest the ex post private value 
of patent rights for West German manufacturing firms in our sample is about 20%.  As with 
all exploratory work, our analysis leaves significant room for improvement and refinement.  
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As richer data become available and more sophisticated methods can be applied, this “market 
uncertainty approach” to learning about the value of patent protection may be quite fruitful.  
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